It is indeed true that when the ship left the dock in Jacksonville the system was a tropical storm. I am not sure what they meant by "still a tropical storm" but it was indeed a tropical storm. But that is not the issue at all.
At the time they left the dock, this was the forecast from the NWS.
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TROPICAL STORM JOAQUIN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER 7
NWS NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL AL112015
1500 UTC TUE SEP 29 2015
THERE ARE NO COASTAL WATCHES OR WARNINGS IN EFFECT.
TROPICAL STORM CENTER LOCATED NEAR 26.5N 70.8W AT 29/1500Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 30 NM
PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WEST OR 260 DEGREES AT 4 KT
ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 1001 MB
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 40 KT WITH GUSTS TO 50 KT.
34 KT....... 0NE 60SE 0SW 0NW.
12 FT SEAS.. 90NE 90SE 60SW 90NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.
REPEAT...CENTER LOCATED NEAR 26.5N 70.8W AT 29/1500Z
AT 29/1200Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 26.5N 70.6W
FORECAST VALID 30/0000Z 26.4N 71.5W
MAX WIND 45 KT...GUSTS 55 KT.
34 KT... 30NE 60SE 20SW 20NW.
FORECAST VALID 30/1200Z 26.3N 72.4W
MAX WIND 45 KT...GUSTS 55 KT.
34 KT... 30NE 60SE 30SW 30NW.
FORECAST VALID 01/0000Z 26.2N 73.1W
MAX WIND 50 KT...GUSTS 60 KT.
50 KT... 30NE 20SE 20SW 30NW.
34 KT... 50NE 70SE 50SW 50NW.
FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 26.1N 73.7W
MAX WIND 55 KT...GUSTS 65 KT.
50 KT... 30NE 30SE 20SW 30NW.
34 KT... 70NE 70SE 70SW 70NW.
FORECAST VALID 02/1200Z 26.0N 74.0W
MAX WIND 60 KT...GUSTS 75 KT.
50 KT... 40NE 40SE 30SW 40NW.
34 KT... 90NE 90SE 80SW 90NW.
EXTENDED OUTLOOK. NOTE...ERRORS FOR TRACK HAVE AVERAGED NEAR 150 NM
ON DAY 4 AND 200 NM ON DAY 5...AND FOR INTENSITY NEAR 15 KT EACH DAY
NEXT ADVISORY AT 29/2100Z
$$
FORECASTER PASCH/BURKE
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Below here we see that the forecast at the time of departure was indeed very good, and when you fold into this the standard Mariners' Safety Rule 1-2-3, we see that there was not any way to bypass this system on the way to Puerto Rico. See also the similar warning at the end of their forecast.
In short, the AP note on what was there at the time and not saying what was actually forecasted at the time is negligent reporting.
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Later we did more analysis of this voyage, comparing the forecast that was available before departure with what took place, along with a projected pressure profile that would have been measured on board with an accurate barometer.
Top left are known positions. Bottom right are the interpolated GFS predicted wind and pressure for those times and positions. |
Too many things failed here:
ReplyDelete1)A boiler was shut down and being repaired while Captain maintained course: hurricane bound. Forty foot seas will challenge any propulsion system, even if in good repair. There are trips on turbines and controls on boilers or diesel engines that don’t always fair well when the ship is being slammed by severe whether it should have been hundreds of miles away from.
2) Cargo Hatch (Scuttles) failed allowing free communication of seawater into the cargo hold.
3) GMDSS did not float free and send data when ship sank, even though ship is sitting “Upright” on the bottom right now. Why Not? And the VDR capsule with EPIRB attached should have been "float free" also. If none of this equipment worked, this is a prime opportunity to require design change.
4) Inflatable liferafts should have been deployed. Even if they could not get to them, they should auto-deploy and inflate when ship sinks. Where were the rafts?
5) Third Mate e-mailed home telling family: “We are headed right for it.” This highlights the reckless course decisions made on the bridge, from Departure to ultimate power loss, hull breech and sinking.
-KMM (Merchant Marine, retired Chief Engineer with 35 years experience)