Monday, October 5, 2015

AP Release on Tragic Loss of El Faro is Misleading.

When it was finally concluded that the vessel had been lost in the storm, the AP release included this statement:


It is indeed true that when the ship left the dock in Jacksonville the system was a tropical storm. I am not sure what they meant by "still a tropical storm" but it was indeed a tropical storm. But that is not the issue at all.

At the time they left the dock, this was the forecast from the NWS.

_________________________________________

TROPICAL STORM JOAQUIN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER   7
NWS NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL       AL112015
1500 UTC TUE SEP 29 2015

THERE ARE NO COASTAL WATCHES OR WARNINGS IN EFFECT.

TROPICAL STORM CENTER LOCATED NEAR 26.5N  70.8W AT 29/1500Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN  30 NM

PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WEST OR 260 DEGREES AT   4 KT

ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 1001 MB
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS  40 KT WITH GUSTS TO  50 KT.
34 KT.......  0NE  60SE   0SW   0NW.
12 FT SEAS.. 90NE  90SE  60SW  90NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT.  RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.

REPEAT...CENTER LOCATED NEAR 26.5N  70.8W AT 29/1500Z
AT 29/1200Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 26.5N  70.6W

FORECAST VALID 30/0000Z 26.4N  71.5W
MAX WIND  45 KT...GUSTS  55 KT.
34 KT... 30NE  60SE  20SW  20NW.

FORECAST VALID 30/1200Z 26.3N  72.4W
MAX WIND  45 KT...GUSTS  55 KT.
34 KT... 30NE  60SE  30SW  30NW.

FORECAST VALID 01/0000Z 26.2N  73.1W
MAX WIND  50 KT...GUSTS  60 KT.
50 KT... 30NE  20SE  20SW  30NW.
34 KT... 50NE  70SE  50SW  50NW.

FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 26.1N  73.7W
MAX WIND  55 KT...GUSTS  65 KT.

50 KT... 30NE  30SE  20SW  30NW.
34 KT... 70NE  70SE  70SW  70NW.

FORECAST VALID 02/1200Z 26.0N  74.0W
MAX WIND  60 KT...GUSTS  75 KT.

50 KT... 40NE  40SE  30SW  40NW.
34 KT... 90NE  90SE  80SW  90NW.

EXTENDED OUTLOOK. NOTE...ERRORS FOR TRACK HAVE AVERAGED NEAR 150 NM
ON DAY 4 AND 200 NM ON DAY 5...AND FOR INTENSITY NEAR 15 KT EACH DAY

NEXT ADVISORY AT 29/2100Z

$$
FORECASTER PASCH/BURKE

_________________________________________


Below here we see that the forecast at the time of departure was indeed very good, and when you fold into this the standard Mariners' Safety Rule 1-2-3, we see that there was not any way to bypass this system on the way to Puerto Rico.  See also the similar warning at the end of their forecast.


In short, the AP note on what was there at the time and not saying what was actually forecasted at the time is negligent reporting.

_____________

Later we did more analysis of this voyage, comparing the forecast that was available before departure with what took place, along with a projected pressure profile that would have been measured on board with an accurate barometer.

Top left are known positions. Bottom right are the interpolated GFS predicted wind and pressure for those times and positions.

This is a plot of the planned route and the available forecast for the final day of the voyage that was readily available to the public the day before the vessel departed. In other words, the AP release  is true, in that the system was indeed  a tropical storm when they left, but at that same time it was also known that it was going to be an actual hurricane when they would meet it. The insert on the bottom left is the pressure trace that would have been observed on board over the voyage.


 

1 comment:

Kevin M. said...

Too many things failed here:
1)A boiler was shut down and being repaired while Captain maintained course: hurricane bound. Forty foot seas will challenge any propulsion system, even if in good repair. There are trips on turbines and controls on boilers or diesel engines that don’t always fair well when the ship is being slammed by severe whether it should have been hundreds of miles away from.
2) Cargo Hatch (Scuttles) failed allowing free communication of seawater into the cargo hold.
3) GMDSS did not float free and send data when ship sank, even though ship is sitting “Upright” on the bottom right now. Why Not? And the VDR capsule with EPIRB attached should have been "float free" also. If none of this equipment worked, this is a prime opportunity to require design change.
4) Inflatable liferafts should have been deployed. Even if they could not get to them, they should auto-deploy and inflate when ship sinks. Where were the rafts?
5) Third Mate e-mailed home telling family: “We are headed right for it.” This highlights the reckless course decisions made on the bridge, from Departure to ultimate power loss, hull breech and sinking.
-KMM (Merchant Marine, retired Chief Engineer with 35 years experience)